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Retrospectives 1971: Learning from the Past

Coalition Warfare—Echoes from the Past
Michael Neiberg
ABSTRACT: The dilemmas posed by coalition warfare were a
subject of academic interest in the inaugural issue of Parameters in
1971. Lieutenant Colonel James B. Agnew examined the unified
command model pursued by the Allies during the First World War.
Agnew’s assessment of the challenges faced by French Marshal
Ferdinand Foch speaks to challenges NATO faces today including
questions of national sovereignty, national security goals, and
developing a joint strategy.

A

t some point in the summer of 1918 (or so the story goes)
French Marshal Ferdinand Foch remarked that since leading
a coalition he had lost some of his admiration for Napoleon.1
By that point Foch had learned how hard it was to keep the interests
and needs of a diverse coalition together in the face of a single enemy.
Fighting against a coalition enabled Napoleon to exploit the differences
and disagreements within it. True to Napoleon’s warning, Foch spent
almost as much time in the final year of the First World War balancing
the competing needs of the French, British, and American coalition
partners as the coalition itself did fighting the Germans.2
In March 1918, with the German Army advancing westward,
the French and British governments at long last agreed to create a
single unified command under Foch’s overall leadership. To Foch’s
mind, however, this one step forward came with two important
steps back. First, the commanders of the French and British armies
(General Henri-Philippe Pétain and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig,
respectively) retained the right to appeal any of Foch’s decisions to
their own civilian governments. Second, those governments had only
given Foch the authority to coordinate strategy. He could not issue direct
orders. The only real power Foch possessed derived from his authority
to distribute soldiers to threatened sections of the front from a unified
general reserve. Foch would therefore have a great deal of responsibility,
but little real authority. Neither the Americans nor the Italians, moreover,
signed on to what became known as the Doullens Agreement, although
in practice they generally followed the system it established.3
In “Coalition Warfare,” a 1971 Parameters article, Lieutenant Colonel
James B. Agnew highlighted the fundamental problem Foch faced.4
Although the various members of a coalition share a common foe and
1. The remark is first attributed to General Albert Sarrail then later to Foch. See Jean-JulesHenri Mordacq, Le Ministère Clemenceau: Journal d’un Témoin, vol. 1 (Paris: Plon, 1931), 240.
2. See Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Foch in Command: The Forging of a First World War General (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), chap. 16.
3. Greenhalgh, Foch in Command, chap. 12.
4. James B. Agnew, “Coalition Warfare,” Parameters 1, no. 1 (Spring 1971): 50–64.
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many common strategic aims, they often differ in how they wish to
pursue those aims or even how much of their nation’s human capital and
treasure they are prepared to devote to a common effort.
In the First World War case under study here, the coalition
experienced two additional complications. First, the French held the
lion’s share of the power by virtue of having by far the largest Allied
army on the Western Front. They were therefore unlikely to yield on
questions of strategy, especially as the war was being fought to liberate
their own soil. Second, although the Americans were slow to arrive,
their growing presence threatened to unbalance the war termination
aims of the coalition. Should the war continue into 1919, the United
States and its mercurial president, Woodrow Wilson, would surely want
a greater voice in Allied strategy and operations than the French and
British were willing to tolerate.
For the Allies, the Americans presented a special problem. Under any
circumstances, as Agnew argued, adding more countries to an alliance
complicates the strategic algebra, requiring members to accommodate
additional and often divergent interests and strategic cultures.5 In the
American case, however, the problem was even more complex, and
not only because of the enormous economic, military, and industrial
power the Americans could bring to bear. Wilson and the United States
possessed a different vision of what the war entailed.
Wilson had belatedly brought his nation into the war, and even then
he had done so as an “associated power,” not as a formal member of the
alliance. He had steadfastly refused to sign the 1915 Treaty of London
that created the legal basis for the Allied coalition, and he had insisted
American soldiers would not be amalgamated into Allied units. They
would fight as an independent American Army on a dedicated part of the
Western Front or they might not fight at all.6 General John Pershing even
went to France with a General Organization Report to this effect in his
pocket, although in practice Pershing made some temporary exceptions
in order to meet the emergency of spring 1918.7 Wilson also spoke of
an ambiguous “peace without victory” that left his French and British
partners, who had been fighting a total war for four years, confounded.8
Perhaps more concerning, Wilson’s great statement of American
strategy, “The Fourteen Points,” seemed aimed at denying the Allies the
very goals for which they were fighting. The points included a call for
“freedom of the seas,” “a reduction of armaments,” an end to empires,
and unfettered global trade. The Germans rejoiced, seeing in Wilson’s
vision a way to gain much of what they wanted from the war even if
5. Agnew, “Coalition Warfare,” 53.
6. Geoffrey Wawro, Sons of Freedom: The Forgotten American Soldiers Who Defeated Germany in World
War I (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 52.
7. Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 168–74.
8. Woodrow Wilson, “Address of the President of the United States to the Senate”
(speech, before the United States Senate, January 22, 1917), http://www-personal.umd.umich
.edu/~ppennock/doc-Wilsonpeace.htm.
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they lost on the battlefield. A peace on Wilson’s terms, they knew, would
leave them in a strong geopolitical position.9 Allied strategists were
appalled by Wilson’s vision of a postwar world, with Haig writing in his
diary on October 21 that “feeling was strong against the president. He
does not seem to realise our requirements.”10 French Premier Georges
Clemenceau famously quipped, “God Almighty has only ten [points]!”11
Nor had the history of coalition operations from 1914 to 1918 given
the British and French much cause for optimism. Agnew reviewed
some of this history, parts of which have become the focus of intensive
scholarly discussion in the years since. Historians continue to debate the
British dilemma in 1914 over how to use their small professional army.
Secretary of State for War Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener argued a
smaller power like Britain had little choice but to hew to the strategic
vision of its larger partner. As he later remarked, Britain had to make
war as it must not as it would like. That decision made it all too easy
for British leaders in the war’s opening weeks to blame the French for
their setbacks.12
As the British Army on the Western Front grew (though it was never
as large as the French Army), the British naturally sought a larger voice
in overall strategy. The French, maybe just as naturally, resisted. Intense
disagreements over strategy for the Battle of the Somme in 1916 led to
considerable bitter feelings, especially in British circles.13
A 1917 scheme by French generals and the British Prime Minister
David Lloyd George to subordinate Haig to overall French direction led
to one of the war’s most serious civil-military relations scandals. Haig and
many other British generals considered resigning before taking any orders
from a foreign general.14 The crisis led to much mutual recrimination
after the French failed disastrously on the Chemin des Dames, forcing
the British to launch a hurried attack around Arras in order to rescue
the French from an offensive Haig and his colleagues had opposed
from the beginning.15 In the Middle East, meanwhile, the position was
reversed. There the British had the preponderance of strength and
therefore called most of the shots, often to France’s chagrin.16
Agnew was concerned with the various wiring diagrams and
command arrangements the Allies developed to solve this problem.
One solution they developed involved creating a committee of senior
9. Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918 (London:
Edward Arnold Publishers, 1997), 426.
10. Gary Sheffield and John Bourne, eds., Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, 1914–1918
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 477.
11. William Ralph Inge, The End of an Age and Other Essays (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 139.
12. George H. Cassar, Kitchener’s War: British Strategy from 1914 to 1916 (Washington, DC:
Potomac Books, 2004), 219.
13. See, for example, Elizabeth Greenhalgh, “Flames over the Somme: A Retort to William
Philpott,” War in History 10, no. 3 (2003): 335–42.
14. Sheffield and Bourne, Douglas Haig, 270–72.
15. Sheffield and Bourne, Douglas Haig, 276–77.
16. See David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of
the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), part six.
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politicians with high-ranking military officials acting as their technical
advisers. The Supreme War Council (SWC), created at Rapallo, Italy,
in November 1917, met at Versailles throughout 1918. Leaning on the
recollections of the American representative to the SWC, General
Tasker H. Bliss, Agnew saw some promise in the scheme, although just
as contemporaries did, he recognized the near impossibility of genuine
combined command being exercised through a committee led by
politicians and depending on compromise and consensus.
We know a great deal more about the SWC today than Agnew
knew 50 years ago. Historian Elizabeth Greenhalgh largely dismissed
the council as a “talking shop” of political subcommittees that, in
the end, mostly failed to do its primary job of coordinating strategy.17
Whereas another historian Meighen McCrae has recently provided a
more sympathetic treatment. Working with the records of the Supreme
War Council itself and moving away from the civil-military controversies
the SWC often symbolized, she finds much to admire. Although
bureaucratic and ill-suited to making rapid decisions, she argues, the
Supreme War Council did provide a critical forum for thinking through
the complexities of coalition operations on diverse and distant fronts as
well as the potential operational impacts of new technologies like the
tank and the airplane. This council may have been the only way for the
great powers to think through the myriad problems of fighting a global
war while pursuing sometimes conflicting strategies and war aims.18
The Supreme War Council was a political and strategic body, not
a military one. Senior military officials attended the sessions, but their
contributions were normally limited to providing technical expertise.
All major decisions rested in the hands of the politicians. To win the war
on the battlefield, the two sides worked through a variety of coalition
models, several of which Agnew considered. The models are important
not only for what they say about the First World War, but how they
have influenced coalition operations since. Agnew saw them as discrete
phases during the course of the war, but because they overlapped, we
might better see them as iterative models rather than sequential ones.
Agnew spent much of his article discussing the most famous model,
the one that, in the end, won the war. This model was inaugurated in
March 1918 in the town hall of Doullens, France, near the suddenly
mobile Western Front. Today a stained glass window in the room marks
this meeting of the leaders of the French and British governments.19
Ferdinand Foch, who had been arguing for a unified command for
months, came to Doullens with a plan to do just that.
More importantly, Foch was the only senior official at the meeting
who projected not just a confidence but a certainty that the terrifying
17. Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 179.
18. Meighen McCrae, Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council
and War Planning, 1917–1918 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1–15.
19. Michael S. Neiberg, Foch: Supreme Allied Commander in the Great War (Washington, DC:
Brassey’s, 2005), 62–65.
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German gains were only temporary. While his colleague Pétain talked
about evacuating Paris, Foch saw that the Allies would be able to stop
the Germans well before they reached the capital if they created a
genuine coalition with one man (himself) in charge.20 When Clemenceau
congratulated Foch on finally getting the unified command he had
always sought, Foch sardonically thanked Clemenceau for the gift. “ ‘It’s
a fine present you’ve made me,’ Foch said to the prime minister. ‘You
give me a lost battle and tell me to win it.’ ”21
If these are the exact words Foch used then he may have been more
prescient than he knew. The French and British governments did indeed
want Foch to win a battle but not necessarily a war. They wanted him
to stop the German offensive and then chase the invaders back across
the Rhine River, but they did not want him making strategic decisions.
As Foch built a coalition and started winning battles, the politicians
grew nervous about some of the decisions he would soon have to make.
Deciding when to end the war, whether Allied troops would cross the
Rhine River, and who would surrender on behalf of the German people
were ultimately political decisions George, Clemenceau, and Wilson
wanted to make themselves.22
This model, minus some of the acrimony, largely shaped the one
the Western allies used to fight and win the Second World War. General
Dwight D. Eisenhower stepped into the role Foch had played in 1918.
Eisenhower’s headquarters were much larger and more international
than Foch’s had been, but Eisenhower shared the same basic approach
of leaving command authority within the national structures as often
as possible. The combined chiefs of staff and the various high-level
conferences during the war acted much as the SWC had. This model
satisfied the need for national sovereignty and was consistent with
western understandings of civilian control of the military.23
Although some readers of this journal in Agnew’s time and our
own might be surprised by the comparison, in a sense, the French in
1944–45 behaved as the Americans did in 1918. In this model, a nation
follows the general strategic guidance of its larger coalition partner,
but jealously guards as much of its own sovereignty as possible. In this
case the roles flipped. In the First World War, the United States needed
French weapons, communications technology, training, staff work,
and much more. Thus although Pershing and Wilson had repeatedly
expressed their unwillingness to follow French strategic guidance, in
fact they had little choice but to do so when it came to Foch’s most
important decisions. Pershing and Bliss had little voice in most of those

20. Neiberg, Foch, 63.
21. Quoted in B. H. Liddell Hart, Foch: The Man of Orleans (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company,
1932), 278.
22. Greenhalgh, Foch in Command, chap. 17.
23. Niall Barr, Eisenhower’s Armies: The American-British Alliance during World War II (New York:
Pegasus, 2015), chap. 13.

Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021
144

Figure 1. Economic and human costs of the First World War
Source of data: “Killed, Wounded, and Missing,” in “World War I,” Britannica online, https://www.britannica.com/eventWorld-War-I/Killed-wounded
-and-missing; and “Financial Cost of the First World War,” Spartacus Educational, (amounts calculated in 2020 USD), https://spartacus-educational
.com/FWWcosts.htm.
(Map by Pete McPhail)
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decisions.24 The United States was not even represented at the French-led
armistice negotiations at Compiègne in November.
Similarly, when the United States recognized Charles de Gaulle’s
Free France in 1944, it was the French, now the junior partner, who
relied on their senior partner. Now the weapons, uniforms, and fuel were
American. Consequently, even though de Gaulle had a starkly different
postwar vision than that of his American partners, he had little choice
but to do (mostly) as the Americans wanted.25 Just as the Americans had
had no representative at Compiègne, the French had no representative at
the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945.
The Germans, whom Agnew did not consider, chose a different
model. Beginning as early as their great victories at Tannenberg and the
Masurian Lakes in 1914, the Germans believed they would have to rescue
their Austro-Hungarian ally from its own incompetence. Even before
the war, General Erich Ludendorff had described Austria-Hungary
as an albatross hung around his neck.26 Germany’s discovery in 1913
that the Austrian head of counterintelligence, Colonel Alfred Redl, had
been selling critical military secrets to Russia further underscored the
German perception of the Habsburgs as, in the famous quip, always
one army, one year, and one idea behind. Austria-Hungary’s string of
defeats early in the war did nothing to change that assessment.27
As a result, the Germans began increasingly to take direct control
over the strategic direction of their Austro-Hungarian allies. Starting
with the massive Gorlice-Tarnów Offensive in the spring of 1915,
German officers even assumed direct command of Austro-Hungarian
units. Thereafter, Germany dominated the strategy of the Central
Powers.28 Thus after the war, the Allies largely treated Austria better
than they did Germany. After all, they reasoned, despite Austria being
largely responsible for the outbreak of the war, most of the critical
decisions thereafter were German. As to the Germans, they solved this
problem for the next war by aggressively pursuing Anschluss, or union
with Austria, in large part so they would have the dominant voice in
strategy from the start.29
In Agnew’s time these same debates influenced the coalition effort
of NATO. Although theoretically an alliance of political equals, in
terms of military power the United States dominated the alliance.
After France left the integrated NATO command structure in 1966,
only the United States and United Kingdom had nuclear weapons.
The Americans, moreover, brought a disproportionate amount of the
24. See Mark E. Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World
War I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
25. Julian Jackson, De Gaulle (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2018), chap. 13.
26. Herwig, First World War, 96.
27. John R. Schindler, “Redl—Spy of the Century?” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 18, no. 3 (2005), 483–507.
28. See Herwig, First World War, 141–45.
29. Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York: Random
House, 2007), chap. 19.
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money, the weapons, and the senior military leaders. So too did they
drive NATO strategy.
The problem for NATO commanders, therefore, remained the
same one Foch had faced in 1918. How could a military coalition
properly pursue the various and diverse political interests of its member
states without becoming so divided that it lost the ability to fight as a
single, unified force? France’s departure from the integrated command
structure proved NATO had not yet solved the problem. Perhaps NATO
was fortunate its adversary, the Warsaw Pact, suffered from many of the
same dilemmas. Still it faced occasional political problems, such as the
uprising in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, just three
years before Agnew wrote his article.30
We can thus read Agnew’s article in two ways. In one sense, he was
trying to understand the problem of coalition operations by looking
backward more than 50 years in order to assess the First World War
model that led to Allied victory in 1918. Much as the Germans of 1918
did, the two Cold War coalitions looked for ways to exploit the divisions
in the enemy’s coalition. In another sense, however, Agnew was trying
to solve a major problem in his own day: how to keep one’s own coalition
intact while simultaneously putting as much pressure as possible on
the enemy’s coalition. In doing so he reinforced the power of Winston
Churchill’s observation that the only thing worse than fighting with
allies is fighting without them.31

30. Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 201–6,
374–75.
31. David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War
(London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 324.

